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Chapter 12 
Evaluating the Success of Transitional Justice in Sierra Leone 
and Beyond 
Kirsten Ainley
1
 
There has been a great deal of academic work undertaken recently that attempts to appraise 
the success of transitional justice (TJ) in various post-conflict states. However, there is little 
agreement on what counts as success and how it should be measured or judged. The other 
chapters in this book consider the extent to which Sierra Leone’s TJ processes should be 
considered a success. I take a step back to focus instead on what we mean by ‘success’ when 
assessing the impacts of TJ efforts and to examine the problems involved in evaluating 
transitional justice. My aim is not to provide a definition of success, as to do so would be 
impossible, for reasons set out below. Rather, I hope to provoke readers to consider afresh 
what should count as TJ success and how it should be evaluated. 
The Sierra Leonean case is regarded by many practitioners and scholars as a success for 
transitional justice: ‘Sierra Leone represents one of the world’s most successful cases of post-
conflict recovery, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.’2 In 2012, the US described Sierra Leone 
as ‘one of the most stable countries in a volatile region’.3 The country recorded a high real 
GDP growth averaging 5.3 per cent between 2007 and 2011, and the growth rate of the Sierra 
Leonean economy in 2012 was, at 15.2 per cent, faster than the rate recorded in any other 
sub-Saharan African state that year.
4
 As well as a strengthening economy, Sierra Leone also 
shows signs of having a strong polity. The 2007 presidential elections saw the first peaceful 
handover of power from the ruling party to the opposition in the country’s history and took 
place without the presence of the UN peacekeepers (who had been present in the 2002 
election which extended the Presidency of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah). In 2012, the third general 
election since the end of the civil war was held, returning President Koroma and the All 
People’s Congress to power. Again, it took place without significant civil unrest or violence. 
So Sierra Leone would seem to be, at least in terms of its topline democratic practices and its 
economic indicators, a successful case of post-conflict transition. 
To what extent is this success due to the TJ mechanisms employed in Sierra Leone (the 
Special Court, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission [TRC], a reparations scheme, local 
justice initiatives and the Lomé amnesty)? Claims of TJ success should be relatively easy to 
analyse in this case. The mechanisms have now largely completed their work, a decade has 
passed since the end of the civil war and there is a great deal of published research on the 
efforts to bring justice to the country. Yet, as I will discuss below, there is surprisingly little 
agreement on what should count as success and whether those standards have been reached. 
This lack of agreement has significant consequences for what we should ‘learn’ from Sierra 
Leone and what we should seek to transpose to other post-conflict situations. There continues 
to be a substantial demand for policy-relevant research to use in future cases of countries 
emerging from conflict or authoritarianism. However, the current state of the literature even 
in a case that looks, at first sight, to be relatively clear-cut, should make TJ scholars modest 
in the advice they are willing to offer. 
In the first half of the chapter, I identify the kinds of factors that are claimed (in literature 
on Sierra Leone and on transitional justice more widely) to demonstrate TJ success or failure. 
Outcomes are by far the most prevalent focus of research, but scholars also make claims 
about the mandate of institutions; processes of establishment and of functioning; involvement 
of, and reaction from, victims and affected populations; adherence to universal normative 
standards; and cost-effectiveness. I note conceptual and methodological challenges of each as 
I discuss them, then suggest (somewhat unhelpfully, having laid out an array of possible 
indicators of success) that the list of factors that could be analysed to judge TJ success should 
be expanded to include the political economy of transitional justice. Having outlined (and 
supplemented) the broad range of factors that might be thought to indicate success or failure, 
I examine, in the second half of the chapter, further key challenges in judging TJ success, the 
challenges of possibility; causality; temporality; aggregation; and generalisability. I conclude 
that four tools can assist in bringing about both the best forms of transitional justice in 
practice and the best evaluations of TJ programmes by scholars: deep engagement with 
contexts; mixed methods; reflexivity and political judgement. 
Indicators of TJ success 
An overview of the literature on the Sierra Leonean case shows a large number of factors 
claimed to indicate the success or otherwise of the TJ programme. The case is representative 
of the broader TJ literature: impact evaluation is a central concern in the most recent 
literature, but what determines impact or success is still controversial. I discuss below the 
various claims made in this literature, with illustrations from the Sierra Leonean case. 
a. Outcomes 
By far the most prevalent measure of TJ success is outcome (sometimes expressed in terms of 
impacts, goals or objectives), with TJ mechanisms being judged according to universal 
standards. However, there is deep disagreement over which outcomes should be measured, 
and contradictory results from recent studies on whether transitional justice does lead to these 
outcomes. 
Skaar identifies the most common areas on which TJ programmes are expected to impact 
as ‘democratisation, rule of law, increased respect for human rights, human rights culture, 
violence reduction, peace, reconciliation’.5 Thoms, Ron and Paris regard the impact of 
transitional justice on six areas as most important to assess: ‘(1) Respect for the core human 
rights to life and the inviolability of the human person, otherwise known as “personal 
integrity rights”; (2) Political violence; (3) Rule of law; (4) Democratization; (5) Popular 
perceptions of regime legitimacy; (6) A political culture of human rights and diversity.’6 
Clark defines transitional justice as a ‘purposive concept, consisting of four essential goals: 
truth, accountability, reparation and reconciliation’.7 Duggan notes that ‘[t]ypical change 
processes or implicit (and often untested) assumptions about the goals of transitional justice 
include social healing (through truth-telling initiatives), reducing recidivism (through 
criminal trials for human rights abusers) and facilitating the formation of new identities 
(through history education reform)’.8 Kritz identifies four objectives that transitional justice 
aims to achieve, the first being: ‘to determine the truth by establishing a record of human 
rights abuses. . . . The second objective is justice. The third is meaningful democratic reform, 
entrenchment of the rule of law within society, and building a society with institutions that 
ensure that the kinds of abuses being dealt with will not recur. The fourth objective is durable 
peace with assurance that a return to violence is fairly unlikely.’9 De Greiff states that 
‘transitional justice measures can be seen as measures that promote recognition, civic trust . . 
. and the democratic rule of law’.10 Important to note are the assumptions of universality 
inherent in these lists: they are intended to be the standards against which all TJ programmes 
are measured. 
Various outcomes are claimed for single TJ mechanisms or combinations of mechanisms 
in Sierra Leone. The UN Security Council has commended the Special Court for 
‘strengthening stability in Sierra Leone and the subregion and bringing an end to impunity’. It 
also commends its outreach activities for ‘contributing to the restoration of the rule of law 
throughout [Sierra Leone and Liberia] and the region.
11
 Others argue that the Court has 
deterred atrocity; for instance, the President of the International Centre for Transitional 
Justice, David Tolbert, said on the Taylor trial: ‘The SCSL’s judgment has . . . provided a 
strong signal to those who want to commit horrific crimes though surrogates and puppets: 
they may not easily hide behind complicated legal constructs and are more certain to face the 
bar of justice.’12 Clark argues that the Court ‘enhanced the degree of truth and accountability 
. . . detracted from the goal of reparations and added little to the goal of reconciliation’.13 In 
this book, Friedman considers the effects of the TRC and local justice initiatives on 
reconciliation, Mitton looks at the effects of the TJ programme on peace and reconciliation 
and Oosterveld examines the rule-of-law contributions made by the TRC and the Court by 
examining their interactions with the domestic legal system. Hollis, in this book, argues that 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) contributed to rule-of-law outcomes in the 
domestic legal system through participation of Sierra Leonean staff in the work of the Court, 
capacity-building and training programmes, and the creation of the Sierra Leone Legal 
Information Institute. Note, however, that Sierra Leone has not held a single prosecution in 
its domestic system for war crimes or crimes against humanity committed during the conflict, 
and many Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC) prisoners taken by the Sierra Leonean government after the Lomé Accords broke 
down were held, sometimes without trial, for up to six years after the conflict concluded.
14
 
These circumstances suggest there is some way to go on entrenching the rule of law in Sierra 
Leone. 
One of the main outcomes measured in TJ literature is the provision of ‘truth’. TRCs 
and, increasingly, courts are assessed on whether they have provided a truthful and 
authoritative record of a conflict and the crimes that took place within it. This is something 
the Sierra Leonean TRC is particularly commended for – it published an extremely detailed 
report along with a shorter version for secondary schools and another directed at children. 
Mahony and Sooka, in this book, applaud the TRC for its account of key incidents within 
Sierra Leone. However, they are critical of the extent to which it was able to illuminate the 
role of external actors and events, in large part because of the politics of its establishment. 
The role of the SCSL in providing an authoritative narrative is more debatable. The Court 
could only hear evidence related to its cases, and was presented information to justify holding 
individuals criminally responsible, not to paint an accurate picture of the conflict (Jordash 
and Crowe, in this book, suggest that the Court was actually incentivised to produce a false 
record, demonising the RUF and propping up Kabbah). However, it is common to see 
justifications of courts as providing a full and authoritative record – as writing history.15 This 
elides the fact that conflicts have causes, characters and consequences that spread far beyond 
individual acts. Truth commissions are much better able to examine the structural and 
ideological features of conflict (in Sierra Leone, the role of the post-colonial state, corruption, 
nepotism and the ethnic divisions in the country, for instance), along with the contributions of 
collective actors such as political administrations and parties, professions (in particular the 
legal profession) and firms (particularly those involved in the extraction and sale of 
diamonds).
16
 However, being well placed in theory to examine these features of conflicts 
does not mean that they will be so in practice. Mahony and Sooka, in this book, criticise the 
TRC for failing to consider the impact of structural adjustment on Sierra Leonean society, the 
increasing concentration of power in the executive or the exclusion of multiple social groups 
from spheres of influence within the system of patrimonial politics. Truth commissions are 
also well placed to identify and/or address the root causes of conflict, which is thought to be a 
route by which transitional justice can help to maintain peace. However, there are doubts 
about whether the identification of root causes alone has any effect in the absence of 
implementation of TRC recommendations.
17
 
A final outcome that features in legal literature but rarely in TJ literature is the 
contributions that Courts in particular can make to international jurisprudence. Hollis and 
Oosterveld, in this book, outline the successes of the Court in terms of generating 
jurisprudence, which can be used by other international courts on forced marriage, sexual 
slavery, the use of child soldiers and attacks on peacekeepers. In contrast, Jordash and Crowe, 
in this book, call into question the quality of the justice served and express profound concerns 
over the use of SCSL decisions as a precedent in future trials. 
The confusion over whether outcomes can be observed is unsurprising when we review 
the results of the more general literature on TJ success. Even when the relevant outcomes are 
agreed upon, recent research has produced contradictory results. Kim and Sikkink find that 
human rights prosecutions and TRCs lead to improvements in human rights protections, and 
that trials also deter future atrocity.
18
 This is in contrast to Snyder and Vinjamuri, who find 
that war crimes trials do very little to deter future atrocity, and suggest that amnesties are 
better able to guarantee durable peace than trials.
19
 In the most comprehensive large-n study 
of TJ to date, Olsen, Payne and Reiter find, in contrast to both of these studies, that single TJ 
mechanisms do not have significant positive effects on human rights or democracy (they do 
not look at peace).
20
 Rather, they find that only combinations of mechanisms including 
amnesty – trials and amnesties or trials, amnesties and truth commissions – bring 
improvements in human rights and democracy. Contrary to Kim and Sikkink, they find that 
truth commissions used in isolation have negative effects. Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 
similarly find that TRCs are associated with an increased risk of the resumption of conflict.
21
 
Thoms, Ron and Paris find that the evidence for transitional justice producing either positive 
or negative outcomes is weak, noting that ‘[g]iven the intensity of the debate over TJ and its 
obvious policy significance, this conclusion may come as a surprise. It is in fact striking that 
so many commentators have expressed such strong positions on the basis of so little reliable 
evidence.’22 
b. Achievement of mandate 
One way that scholars narrow down the range of outcomes that might contribute to TJ 
success is to examine the objectives listed in the founding documents of institutions or their 
mandates. This relates most obviously to new institutions such as courts or commissions 
rather than initiatives taken within existing domestic structures, or amnesties. Looking at 
mandates makes sense as it is likely to be easier to judge whether a TJ institution has 
succeeded in achieving its mandate than it would be to prove, for instance, that it has 
achieved peace. In the case of Sierra Leone, there is significant debate on whether the SCSL 
tried the right people to achieve its mandate of prosecuting persons who bore the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian and Sierra Leonean law 
committed in Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. Should President Kabbah also have 
been tried (as Hinga Norman’s senior in the chain of command)? President Compaoré of 
Burkina Faso, who funded and armed the RUF? Muammar Gaddafi, on whose territory the 
RUF was formed, and who continued to fund them through their rebellions in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone? ECOMOG forces, who participated in looting and the bombardment of civilian 
targets? Mercenaries such as Sandline and Executive Outcomes, also rumoured to have taken 
part in atrocities? There is no objective standard of ‘who bears the greatest responsibility’, 
and in the end the Court prosecuted both those who were judged by the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) to bear a high level of responsibility and also against whom sufficient 
evidence could be found.
23
 Sceptics argue that lack of prosecution of Compaoré and Gaddafi, 
for example, was more to do with pressure from funding states exerted on the OTP to ensure 
that the US and the UK’s relationships with Libya in particular did not become the business 
of the Court.
24
 
In terms of the TRC, Friedman, in this book, takes this approach – she looks at the extent 
to which the Commission achieved its objectives and notes that most research on it tends to 
evaluate the Commission according to standards (for instance, the extent to which it brought 
about personal healing) that were outside its remit. She argues that it should be judged instead 
by its ability to generate political trust and solidarity. With regards to the TRC’s objectives, 
Friedman notes that one of the main criticisms of the TRC is the failure until very recently of 
the reparations programme, leaving many of the participants at the TRC feeling let down by 
the process, on which more below. 
However, to assess an institution according to its own mandate is to accept the way it, or 
the political actors that constituted the institution, defines its goals. Mandates are political 
documents as much as or more than they are ethical documents, subject to negotiation and 
wrangling, and as important for what they leave out as what they include. The mandate of the 
SCSL effectively limited the Court to consideration of acts by individuals rather than 
organisations (though the Joint Criminal Enterprise mode of liability was used to ascribe 
common acts to individual perpetrators) or states. The mandate of the Court, therefore, 
foreclosed consideration of anything except the actions of a small number of ‘evil’ 
individuals, excluding the responsibility of corporations mining diamonds or private military 
companies (in particular Executive Outcomes and Sandline), engaged on behalf of one or 
more parties to the conflict. Similarly, states and private actors supplying arms to combatants 
were left to be dealt with by a poorly resourced truth commission that had no retributive 
powers with which to confront these actors.
25
 
c. Processes of establishment and of functioning 
If the research findings on TJ outcomes are contradictory, but we want to look beyond 
institutional mandates, then TJ processes may be worth assessing. Scholars and practitioners 
have looked at the extent to which mechanisms were established legitimately, or at the will of 
particular political interests. The legitimacy of the Sierra Leonean TRC is rarely questioned 
on this basis (though Mahony and Sooka, in this book, note the exclusion of key groups from 
its design and from the selection of its key personnel). However, there are many questions 
around the legitimacy of the SCSL.
26
 Others judge the extent to which TJ processes were 
inclusive, fair, free from political interference,
27
 reflective of the local political, legal and 
cultural contexts,
28
 observant of the highest legal standards,
29
 balanced (in terms of targeting 
all parties to a conflict) and so on. 
Public engagement has also received increased attention recently. The UN Secretary 
General (UNSG) argues that ‘the most successful transitional justice experiences owe a large 
part of their success to the quantity and quality of public and victim consultation carried out. 
Local consultation enables a better understanding of the dynamics of past conflict, patterns of 
discrimination and types of victims’, citing Sierra Leone as an example of a more open and 
consultative trend.
30
 He also argues that ‘it is essential that [TJ] efforts be based upon 
meaningful public participation involving national legal professionals, Government, women, 
minorities, affected groups and civil society.’31 In fact, local involvement is probably a 
normative standard (discussed below) rather than a causal factor in TJ success. There is no 
evidence offered by the UNSG, or any I am aware of more widely, that supports his claim 
that public participation is essential. 
In the case of Sierra Leone, the ability of TJ mechanisms to coordinate their processes is 
also suggested as a determinant of success. Schabas argues that the SCSL and the TRC 
worked well together, and this case is often used as an example of how courts and TRCs can 
be used to provide a more holistic approach to justice than trials alone.
32
 But what standards 
do we judge this collaboration by? TRC commissioners did not feel that the collaboration was 
successful – perpetrators were reluctant to speak at the TRC for fear of later prosecution by 
the Court, and the Court saw itself as having legal superiority over the TRC.
33
 Does the mere 
production of a TRC report and completion of trials render the court–commission pairing a 
success? Or should we be concerned, for instance, about the ways that trials can limit the 
amount of truth telling at TRCs?
34
 
Linked to issues of both process and outcome, the literature on Sierra Leone also features 
many authors listing ‘firsts’ as a mark of success – first hybrid court, first criminalisation of 
the use of child soldiers and forced marriage, first court to conclude a trial against a sitting 
Head of State and so on; for instance: ‘[T]he Special Court is the first modern international 
court located in the country where the prosecuted crimes were committed. It is also the first 
such tribunal that was created by a bilateral treaty, co-existed with a truth and reconciliation 
commission, has a far-reaching outreach programme, and relies mostly on national staff.’35 
This is, however, an illegitimate way to judge success – there is no inherent reason to believe 
that an institution that does something first does it right. It is likely that these arguments are 
actually being used to advance a ‘justice cascade’36 or norm diffusion position, which may be 
a legitimate measure of success, but only if you are in favour of the norm supposedly being 
diffused. 
However, these claims about ‘firsts’ are more frequent than other claims about process. It 
is not at all clear that anyone outside a narrow community of international lawyers cares 
much that the defence was not properly resourced for any of the SCSL trials, that Charles 
Taylor’s conviction should probably be regarded as a failure for the OTP (as he was 
convicted only on relatively minor grounds of planning and aiding and abetting crimes in 
Sierra Leone) or that the jurisprudence on Joint Criminal Enterprise at the SCSL contradicts 
past precedents at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). There is a little more attention on 
political interference in TJ mechanisms, but outcomes in general seem far more meaningful 
to commentators than issues of process. 
d. Involvement of and reaction from victims and affected populations 
The issue of public participation, discussed in the section above, is complemented in recent 
TJ literature by a broader consideration of public interest. Critics of Sierra Leonean 
transitional justice have shown through ethnographic research that the TJ programme did not 
speak to local understandings of justice and reconciliation.
37
 Proponents of Sierra Leonean 
transitional justice use survey-based research to argue that it did speak to local needs, often 
citing the role of the outreach programme of the Court.
38
 Hollis, in this book, uses survey 
data to demonstrate the SCSL’s success in terms of its objectives, the generation of public 
trust and in bringing to trial those who bore the greatest responsibility for crimes. 
The Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS) survey on the effects of TJ 
mechanisms is equivocal on the role of public interests, seeing context as key to success here: 
[I]f there is reliable evidence that a population perceives TJ to be crucial – and that it 
views the absence of TJ as evidence of their own government’s illegitimacy – this should 
be given considerable weight in evaluating TJ options for that country. Conversely, if 
there is little demand for TJ within a population, or if the people clearly indicate that they 
have other priorities, there needs to be a clear and compelling rationale for outsiders to 
treat TJ as a priority matter.
 39
 
e. Adherence to universal normative standards 
On the other end of the spectrum from public interest and outcome-orientation is the 
conception of transitional justice as needing to adhere to particular (usually universal) 
normative standards in order to be judged as successful. Regardless of their impact or their 
public perception, TJ mechanisms might be judged according to, for instance, the goals they 
set for themselves and the actors they involve. The UNSG claims that: 
[t]he challenges of post-conflict environments necessitate an approach that balances a 
variety of goals, including the pursuit of accountability, truth and reparation, the 
preservation of peace and the building of democracy and the rule of law. A 
comprehensive strategy should also pay special attention to abuses committed against 
groups most affected by conflict, such as minorities, the elderly, children, women, 
prisoners, displaced persons and refugees, and establish particular measures for their 
protection and redress in judicial and reconciliation processes.
40
  
Gender is a particularly important factor here. Calls for women’s participation in transitional 
justice are rarely made on the basis of evidence that such participation leads to one or more 
desirable outcomes. Instead, they are made on the basis of the normative value placed by 
those making the calls on gender equality or inclusivity. Similarly, future TJ mechanisms are 
likely to be assessed more frequently on the basis of the contributions they make to ‘revealing 
gendered patterns of abuse, enhancing access to justice, and building momentum for 
reform’.41 This is not because such contributions would necessarily bring positive outcomes 
in terms of human rights observance, peace, reconciliation and so on (and in fact the 
inclusion of women as equal parties with equal voice in TJ could exacerbate rather than quell 
social tensions) but because it is ‘right’ to do so.42 
f. Cost-effectiveness 
A final factor used in making judgements of TJ success is cost-effectiveness. Donors in 
particular tend to be concerned about this, and, again, it is an area about which contradictory 
claims are made about the SCSL in particular (the other TJ mechanisms in Sierra Leone 
being far cheaper). Some argue that the Special Court as a hybrid model should, in principle, 
be more cost-effective than the prior international criminal tribunals.
43
 Others note that the 
Court has, in practice, been tremendously expensive.
44
 At a total cost of close to $250 million 
for the trials of 13 indictees, it certainly does not compare favourably to the cost of domestic 
criminal trials.
45
 And the funding model of the court, which was based on voluntary 
contributions, also led to inefficiencies. The UN had to step in twice to bail out the court 
when contributions from states were not forthcoming, and Court officials spent a great deal of 
time soliciting funds. 
g. The political economy of TJ 
An aspect of transitional justice that has not received enough attention is the big-picture 
political economy of TJ projects, particularly in poor countries. Some work has been done on 
the cost of international justice;
46
 the problems of the voluntary contributions funding model 
of the SCSL discussed above; the subjecting of accountability mechanisms to market-based 
rationality;
47
 and the consequences of witness payments at the court.
48
 However, the 
economics of transitional justice are important in three further respects, all of which are 
worthy of further investigation. First, the success or otherwise of reparations schemes 
receives far too little critical attention, certainly in the case of Sierra Leone, along with its 
relation to other TJ mechanisms. Second, the financial spoils available to post-conflict states 
that implement the TJ mechanisms currently popular in the international community can be 
measured as indicators of a particular kind of success (though the spoils available to 
individual participants may corrupt the TJ process). Third, and probably the most serious, the 
implications of choosing particular forms of transitional justice (i.e., mechanisms that largely 
exclude considerations of socio-economic issues) and what these choices means for the likely 
success of transitional justice in stabilising peace or deterring future conflict. 
Despite being mandated in the TRC report as a key measure to bring rehabilitation and 
healing, a reparations scheme was not set up in Sierra Leone in a timely or efficient way, and 
reasonable reparations have not been paid to those most severely affected by the war. 
Reparations were probably the aspect of the TJ programme that was most important to most 
Sierra Leoneans – 53 per cent of whom still live below the national poverty line.49 Yet it took 
until 2008 for the government of Sierra Leone, with support from the UN Peace-building 
Fund and the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), to found the Sierra Leone 
Reparations Programme (SLRP). This was much to the disappointment of the people who had 
testified at the TRC or the SCSL because they expected it to materially improve their lives in 
some way (often because they had been led to expect this by community leaders, NGOs or 
the government).
50
 In fact, ex-combatants were aided before victims, which victims viewed 
as unfair, particularly where financial aid or training enabled ex-combatants to create 
monopolies in certain businesses.
51
 Once the SLRP was established, victims were given a flat 
sum of $100 each, and by 2013, the most severely affected amputees and war-wounded 
people were given payments of $1400 and asked to sign documents giving assurances that 
they would not request any more.
52
 
In terms of interaction between TJ mechanisms, Clark notes that the SCSL had a 
negative impact on the reparations process in a number of ways. Most importantly, ‘it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the cost of the court depleted the international resources 
available for reparations thus directly detracting from the reparations provided to the Sierra 
Leonean victims’.53 The SCSL cost a total of around $250 million and was funded through 
voluntary contributions (and via the UN as emergency measures when those voluntary 
contributions fell short). The reparations programme was also funded with voluntary 
contributions, but managed only $4.4 million to try to help more than 32,000 registered war 
victims. Clark also quite rightly notes that the Court failed to exercise its Article 19(3) 
powers to order the forfeit of unlawfully acquired property, proceeds or assets and restore 
them to their rightful owner or the state (from where they could have been used to 
supplement the reparations coffers), or to prosecute any members of the arms or diamond 
industries that benefitted from (and likely enabled) crimes during the conflict.
54
 So an 
opportunity cost of the SCSL would seem to be an under-resourced reparations programme. 
At a further level of remove, however, the economic story looks to be a positive one – 
significant spoils in terms of overseas development aid (ODA) are correlated to the 
establishment and operation of the TJ programme (in particular the SCSL) in Sierra Leone. 
The government of Sierra Leone worked with powerful sponsors of their TJ process, and has 
reaped the rewards: net ODA per capita per annum has increased by an average of 63 per cent 
since the war and $1.7 billion of debt was cancelled through the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative.
55
 Of course, counterfactual analysis cannot prove that Sierra Leone 
would not have received this money anyway, but there is a striking correlation at first sight 
between the largest donors to the SCSL and the largest contributors of ODA to Sierra Leone 
(the US and the UK).
56
 The Special Court also featured a number of times in the EU 
document setting out the aid programme to Sierra Leone for 2008–2013, which pledged a 
total of €242 million over the period plus contributed an extra €24 million in 2012.57 Work to 
determine whether states that implement a particular TJ mechanism or combination of 
mechanisms get significant financial inducement to do so, or reward for having done so, is 
outside the scope of this chapter, but sorely needed. In parallel, research would also be useful 
on the financial inducements available to individuals who encourage participation in TJ 
processes. In very poor states, it is hardly surprising to find people willing to testify at a 
Court or to tell stories to a TRC in return for material assistance.
58
 While this may be entirely 
understandable in situations of serious poverty, the normative processes and goals of 
transitional justice rely on participants telling the truth rather than telling the stories that will 
make them the most money. 
Third, there is a much more radical aspect to taking economics seriously in evaluating TJ 
programmes – the current liberal practices of transitional justice focus on individual actors 
and bringing about changes to political institutions. In doing so, ‘TJ renders the continuity of 
socioeconomic dimensions of conflict irrelevant for the democratic legitimation of the new 
regime’.59 Van der Merwe reaches a similar conclusion: ‘This focus [on providing justice 
only for acts deemed to be politically motivated] effectively sidelines the more common 
economic or social abuses that generally occur in oppressive regimes – abuses that may well 
be the underlying reason for conflict over political power in the first place.’60 Horovitz takes 
a more liberal line, but still argues that ‘[t]he international community cannot overlook the 
fact that for TJ mechanisms to have a sustainable effect, attention must be given to fighting 
poverty and encouraging development. . . . Alleviating poverty will enable the population to 
engage in social and political reform; it will also mitigate public bitterness which may easily 
serve to promote the political agendas of opportunistic and corrupt elements within the 
society.’61 Hoffman, writing specifically about the Sierra Leonean case, notes how little 
transitional justice has done for Sierra Leoneans: ‘[D]espite millions of dollars spent on these 
proceedings, neither body has succeeded in fundamentally changing the daily lives of Sierra 
Leoneans.’62 While it might be argued that TJ mechanisms are not well placed to confront the 
socio-economic conditions that may have been root causes of the conflict, the normative 
imperative of confronting them somehow – because justice requires it, not just because doing 
so is likely to stabilise the peace – should not be forgotten.63 
Further challenges in evaluating transitional justice 
Even if agreement could be reached about which factors are relevant in judging the success of 
transitional justice, there are five further challenges to be confronted in evaluation: the 
challenges of possibility, causality, temporality, aggregation and generalisability. 
First, some decision needs to be made as to what was possible in any given situation 
before the success of transitional justice can be deduced. There is little point in judging TJ 
mechanisms according to standards they could never have attained. These mechanisms are 
usually established in post-conflict contexts in which it is surprising they achieve any traction 
at all given the lack of domestic resources that are available. Yet they are often invested with 
unrealistic expectations. As Duggan notes, transitional justice is ‘almost always the result of 
political compromise and seldom reflects the ideal state of justice. Yet, in transitional justice 
research and practice, mechanisms are almost always measured against someone’s ideal 
concept of justice.’64 The TRC in Sierra Leone, for instance, could never have guaranteed 
reconciliation on an interpersonal level – it could only act at the level of the collective. The 
Court could not have tried all those responsible for atrocities in the war. And the reparations 
scheme could not have restored to people what they lost in material terms during the conflict. 
Second, if markers of success are noted in a given case, work needs to be done to 
establish whether it was in fact TJ mechanisms that brought them about or if we are 
observing a correlative rather than causal relationship. For instance, transitional justice in 
Sierra Leone preceded improvements in human rights observance and democracy according 
to a major study.
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 But did the TJ programme cause these improvements? If so how? Or 
could the end of the civil war as a military defeat rather than a negotiated bargain, along with 
continued UK intervention and support, have caused both? Brahm, in a study of truth 
commissions, notes that ‘[a] commission’s creation is a reflection of the preliminary moves to 
establish a more democratic system that respects human rights’.66 This suggests that if 
democracy and human rights improvements are observed after the creation of the 
commission, this may be a reflection of a prior commitment to such improvements rather 
than the improvements being caused by the commission. In fact, the commission in this case 
would likely also have been caused by prior commitment to such improvements. 
In addition to the problem of endogeniety there is a problem of intervening variables. 
There are usually so many other factors that could have influenced outcomes (in Sierra 
Leone, for instance, the UN Peace-building Fund, the massive international aid programmes, 
the British military presence and investment in reforming the armed forces and police, the 
formation of the Anti-Corruption Commission, etc.) that it seems impossible to separate out 
which causes led to which outcomes. Horovitz recognises the limits of the SCSL in achieving 
peace and justice without such intervening variables: ‘[W]ithout additional measures 
employed by the government and the international community to promote sustainable 
transformation and to put an end to endemic corruption and mismanagement, as effective as 
the Court may be in conducting trials, it will be unsuccessful in promoting sustainable peace 
and reliable justice.’67 
One way to confront the challenge of causality is to theorise (rather than just describe or 
evaluate) transitional justice – to develop theories of how TJ mechanisms might bring about 
change (and what other factors might also lead to changes in the variables we are interested 
in). For some scholars these are ‘pathways to impact’ between, for instance, transitional 
justice and democracy, such as the delegitimation of past abusers and potential spoilers, the 
promotion of reforms and the empowerment of previously marginalised actors.
68
 For others 
they are ‘social mechanisms’ such as norm affirmation and the articulation and disarticulation 
of networks.
69
 The establishment of coherent theories of change assists TJ evaluation as the 
researcher can investigate evidence of the pathways in order to draw causal inferences about 
the effects of transitional justice versus other factors. One problem this does not solve, 
however, is whether the effects of individual TJ mechanisms can be isolated. In the Sierra 
Leonean case a major recent study has been undertaken on the legacy of the SCSL.
70
 Yet a 
number of the chapters in this book suggest that success can only be appreciated if the 
interactions between TJ mechanisms (including those in the domestic system) are assessed.
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Duggan doubts whether it will ever be possible to establish causal relationships in transitional 
justice: ‘[T]he change being sought through a transitional justice mechanism will be 
nonlinear, the result of multiple interactions by numerous actors. . . . As social interventions, 
one of the most critical features of transitional justice processes is that they are nested in 
social systems. It is through the workings of entire systems of social relationships that any 
changes in behaviour or social conditions will be effected.’72 
The third challenge is one of temporality. Sierra Leone should be a good case in which to 
measure success as a decade has now passed since the end of the war, so there has been 
plenty of time for measureable effects to have emerged from the TJ programme. Yet it may 
be that too much time has passed. To avoid mistakenly including the effects of intervening 
variables as TJ success, it may be necessary to carry out research very quickly. But to ensure 
that success observed is not transient, it will be useful to try to trace out the pathways to TJ 
success after a much longer period – perhaps even a generation. Van der Merwe suggests that 
only the most immediate outcomes (for instance, the experience of individuals after testifying 
to a truth commission) can be reliably credited to TJ mechanisms, though he argues that 
measuring specific immediate effects could give indications of the broad structural changes 
these might feasibly lead to.
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Fourth, there is the challenge of aggregation. Is it possible to add together all of the 
various micro claims about success and failure of specific TJ mechanisms or combinations of 
mechanisms to make a single macro judgement about whether transitional justice in a 
particular state has been a success? Should the possible outcomes of transitional justice be 
ranked – either generally or in specific situations? For instance, was it more important for the 
TJ programme in Sierra Leone to support peace and political stability than to provide 
reparations or a high quality of legal procedures? Clark’s detailed analysis of the SCSL 
clearly demonstrates the problem here. She outlines the various contributions the SCSL made 
or failed to make to the four goals she sees as essential to TJ, but gives no indication of how 
she moves from this fine-grained analysis through a weighing of the positive and negative 
contributions she finds for each goal to her broad conclusions that the Court was overall a 
success.
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The final challenge is one of generalisability. If conclusions can be reached about the 
Sierra Leonean case, under what circumstances might they provide lessons learned for other 
post-conflict (or other transitional) situations? How can contextual reasons for success be 
separated from structural reasons in order to ascertain whether the same combination of TJ 
mechanisms would work well elsewhere? Could the contradictory results in the large-n 
studies discussed above be caused by a lack of attention to context? In judging the success of 
transitional justice in Sierra Leone, Rodman argues that the rejection of the Lomé amnesty 
was only possible because of the British military intervention in 2000 that returned Kabbah 
strongly to power. If Kabbah had had to power-share, then the amnesty would have had to 
stand and the prospects for transitional justice in Sierra Leone would have been rather 
different.
75
 Similarly, Harris argues that the fact that two of the three principal warring 
factions (the AFRC and the RUF) had either disintegrated or were unable to build a political 
support base at the time the SCSL started its work was a critical factor in the Court being able 
to prosecute war crimes without endangering peace.
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 When the different sides of a conflict 
retain support, it is likely to be much more difficult either to achieve a negotiated end to the 
conflict that includes criminal justice provisions or to run prosecutions without risking the 
provocation of new discontent. Schabas has a more negative view of the Sierra Leonean 
context: ‘A useful comparison can be made with South Africa, where the TJ institutions were 
part of a much broader social transformation, driven by an extremely dynamic civil society. 
Sierra Leone lags far behind South Africa in this respect. And this sad conclusion inevitably 
limits the potential of the Sierra Leonean TRC to influence the future of this troubled 
country.’77 As will be clear, applying lessons learned from specific contexts is not 
straightforward: it will not always be either possible or ethical to enforce a decisive military 
(rather than negotiated) end to a conflict; the political power of parties to conflict varies 
across contexts; and a dynamic civil society cannot simply be created for the purposes of 
transitional justice. 
Conclusion 
I have started to parse out the various claims that are made in the course of TJ evaluations, 
yet parsing out claims is just the beginning. Scholars must continue to strive to find ways to 
judge the past and to use those judgements to assist in deciding what to do in the future. 
There is a great deal of resource being invested in transitional justice globally, and academics 
are frequently asked to work with policy makers to decide how TJ mechanisms should be 
designed for particular contexts. There is a body of contradictory large-n and small-n research 
on transitional justice that does not mark a clear path forward, yet forward we will inevitably 
go. Four tools will aid the journey: deep engagement with contexts, mixed methods, 
reflexivity and political judgement. 
Deep engagement with contexts has both retrospective and prospective elements. 
Transitional justice has been evaluated, for the most part, by social scientists, but we cannot 
evaluate TJ success without rich histories. Many of the chapters in this book engage with the 
history of Sierra Leone to understand the effects of its TJ programme, and strong historical 
knowledge can be as persuasive as or even more persuasive than robust social scientific 
analysis. As the CIPS report argues, ‘[c]ross-national findings are important, but nothing can 
replace the “art” of considered, country-specific debate and judgment’.78 
Engagement with contexts should take place using a range of methods. Researchers will 
be drawn to focus on different areas, and the breadth of the knowledge generated will help to 
build up a patchwork picture of the impacts of transitional justice. Varied methodologies and 
varied research questions should get around the problem of having to decide precisely what 
success is – successes and failures, from various points of view, will be revealed in the detail 
of the studies – and readers will have to decide what they particularly value about transitional 
justice  when trying to draw conclusions from the body of research. The chapters in this book 
are a good demonstration of this – each author has their own area of particular concern and 
therefore their own views on the relative success of transitional justice in Sierra Leone. 
Large-n and medium-n studies are also valuable, as scholars can tack backwards and 
forwards between information on global trends and specific cases. This will not lead to 
agreement, but to more nuanced and granular, and therefore productive, disagreement. 
Even if agreement cannot be reached on whether or not transitional justice in Sierra 
Leone or elsewhere was a success, it would help to progress the debate if scholars were aware 
of, and reflected upon, the standards by which they evaluate transitional justice. Reflexivity 
involves being cognisant of your own priorities and biases, willing to challenge your own 
assumptions and willing to accept that a range of incommensurable views may all have 
validity. We may never be able to find a definitive answer, for instance, for how to rank the 
wishes of victims against the importance of peace, or against the ending of impunity, in any 
one context, let alone across all of them. An awareness of one’s position in the debate and the 
bases on which that position is taken would be useful. 
Reflexivity, mixed methods and deep engagement with contexts will give rich but 
contested narratives that can inform decisions in future situations. But to inform them well, 
another ingredient is needed: political judgement. Working respectfully through a range of 
positions is very hard and it is even harder to make judgements. Yet if we want to influence 
transitional justice in practice, judgement is necessary. Various actors within the international 
community will continue to push for TJ programmes to take place after conflict, and victims 
and the public may support this, particularly if there is a sense that it will be financially 
beneficial, either to individuals or to the state as a whole. We need to judge when transitional 
justice might be successful in a particular context because the money and effort that goes into 
a TJ programme is not going elsewhere – a decision needs to be made, for instance, that 
funding some particular kinds of TJ projects will bring more benefits than working on 
security sector reform or poverty reduction. These judgements will be imperfect and fallible, 
but unavoidable: ‘Indexed as we are to time and place, limited in knowledge and constrained 
by the need to act, our practical judgments are shot through with fallibility. But trying to be 
infallible is no more rational than trying to grow wings.’79 They will also be political – they 
will involve working through a set of contested claims including about whose needs to 
prioritise, which actors to prosecute and which to empower. Working through what TJ 
success might mean in and across contexts, and what the challenges are in evaluating it, may 
be a small but necessary step along the path to improved (but imperfect) TJ policy in the 
future. 
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